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Recently there has been considerable interest m the 
issue of the liberalization of the branching laws that 
currently constrain the location ofammercial banks. 
The McFadden Act of 1927 allows the states to 
regulate the branching of both federally and state- 
chartered banks. The related issue of interstate bank- 
ing has brought with it much discussion .The issues 
include concern over the possible failure of existing 
banks and the introduction of destructive com- 
petition brought about by new entry.’ Much debate 
still exists over the associated issues of economies of
scale in banking as well as the differential effects ofde 
IIOLY) entry and new branching on competition.2 
This paper extrapolates from differences in mor- 
tgage rates between branching and unit banking 
states to assess the likely consequences of interstate 
banking on competition. A reduced-form equation 
explains differentials in mortgage rates as a function 
of demand, risk, supply of funds, and market structure 
variables. The results confirm the basic outcome of 
competitive behavior. The greater the number of 
competing lirms and tt,e lower the concentration f 
deposits in a market area, the lower will be interest 
rates on mortgages, ceteris parrotrs. One policy con- 
’ For discus&n of these issues see Ssvage and Solomon ( 1980). 
* For discussion of economies of scafe in banking se Benston 
(1972b. Rhoades (1977) and Heggestad(N79) review Ihe litemtue on 
competition in banking. 
elusion is that at least in the mortgage market he 
spread of interstate banking will, ceferis par‘ibus, 
decrease competition if’it increases deposit concentra- 
tion levels and lowers the number of competing firms. 
One means of lowering mortgage rate diflerentials is 
through increased control of branching and the 
reiaxation ofentry restrictions f new tim=. It is also 
argued that only those states under statewide branch- 
ing laws may receive more competitive environments 
from the introduction of Interstate banking. 
PREVIOUS RFSEARCH 
The relationship between market structure and per- 
formance infinancial markets has been the subject of 
many studies Measures of performance have in- 
cluded profit rates, interest ra es charged on loans, 
interest rates payed on deposits, ervice charges, and 
hours of operation Since the present paper uses 
interest rates oc loans as the measure ofperformance, 
this discussion is confined primarily to previous 
studies that use interest rates to measure performance. 
Locational differences in demand for funds affect 
differentials in i terest rates. As proxies for the 
demand for housing, Aspinwall(l970) and Davis and 
Verbrugge (1978) use changes in the number of 
households, while Kaufman (1966) uses changes in 
population. Differences in borrower risk also account 
for interest rate di&rentials. Davis and Verbrugge 
(1978) find that the ratios of the installment-to- aud 
construction-to-total mortgage losns afiect rates pos- 
itively. Longbrake and Peterson (1979) find that past 
Izises raise interest rates. 
Differences in market strurtllre also explain inlerest 
rate differentials. Aspinwali (1970). Fr;;ser and Rose 
(1371;. and Lonpbrake and Peterson (1979) find both 
the number of firms and concentration ratios affecting 
interest rates in the predicted direction. Edwards 
(1964. Rhoades(l9i7). and Longbrake and Peterson 
( 1979: find no :.ignificant relationship betwtin interest 
rates and branching I,iws. Relatively lower rates of 
mobility and turnov-r for the three largest banks in 
unit binking states is found in IHeggestad and 
Rhoadej ( 1976). 
One problem in all these studies, that market 
structure is defined b} only one type of lender, is most 
‘-;‘rlous when more than one type of firm serves the 
market. as is the case for mortgages. Flechsig (1965) 
and K&man (1966) study the effect of commercial 
hank structure on bu*;iness loan rates in various 
Standard Mrwopolita:.. Stawical Areas (SMSAs). 
Aspinwaii i 1970) uses a sample of commercial bank 
mortgage rates in 31 SMSAs. Fraser and Rose (1971) 
cott\ider acerage loan rates of commercial banks in 78 
“rm;di” cities in Texas. Heggestad and Mingo (1976) 
uq a sample of 236 commercltil banks in 52 SMSAs 
I&; study dilTeren:iais in new car loan rates. Davis and 
Vcrbrugge (19781 stud? locational differences in 
arerage mortgage loan yields of 795 savings and loan 
a\scK-latirjns. Lonpbrake and Peterson (1979) use data 
from YI I commercial hanks to study differences in 
a\erape yields on mortgage portfolros. Rhoades 
I 1979) considers a sample of 184 SMSAs to test the 
ciFc!t of thrift institutions on the average yield on 
t~nl. loan>. 
TO control for the e&3 of nonbdnk lenders on 
performance. several studies use a dichotomous 
~arwble. Heggestd and Mingo (1976) find that the 
Prc=nce of savir,gs, and loan associations helps to 
explain differentials in service charges on demand 
dcpcGts at commercial banks. Other methods of 
cuntrolhng for competing firms have also been used. 
Kaufman (Is)661 found that the ratio of savings and 
loan assocwtion assets to commercial bank deposits 
.iffwted commercial bank loan rates in one of two 
?i-ars tested. White (1976) found that the combined 
number c4 savings and loan associations and com- 
mewal hanks affected the number of commercial 
hank ofliw. Davis and Verbrugge (1978) ftnd a small 
but significant effect on mortgage rates of savings and 
loan aswciations when the deposit concentration 
ratarTs and ilumber of firms inclrlde mutual savings 
barrhs and commercial hanks aloilp with savings and 
loan ah5mclattons. Rlhoades (1979) finds some evi- 
’ See Wcggc-ti ( 1474) for a tbomlgh review of lhis litetature. 
dence that nonbank thrifts inlluence the portfolio 
decisions of commercial banks. 
These studies suggest two avenues for new re- 
search. First, one should consider all competing firms 
in market performance. Studies tl:tat do not do SO may 
lead to biased results. In parl:icular, studies that 
consider only one form of organization may over- 
estimate the impact of market structure and com- 
petition on performance in markets with many 
competing firms. Second, new ways of considering 
competing firms will provide more information on 
how “competitive” or substitutable they are in prod- 
uct markets. One obvious way of improving measures 
of market structure is to substitute quantitative 
measures of r,onbank ccmpetition for the dichotom- 
ous measures of nonbank presence used in White 
(1976). Davis and Verbrugge (1978). and Rhoades 
( 1979). 
DATA 
Thus a study of diRerences in performance across 
areas must include all the major firms. This point is 
especially relevant because of the growing homo- 
geneity of depository linancial institutions brought 
about by the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. This paper 
models the mortgage market because it is a distinct 
market with many competing financial institutions. 
As such the likely effects of interstate banking may be 
best observed in the mortgage market, 
The data employed in this paper (Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board, 1979) result from a survey of all 
qualifying loans in 1975 for single-family. nonfarm, 
conventional mortgages closed during the first five 
working days ofeach month. Respondents include all 
the major mortgage ‘lenders: commercial banks. 
mortgage bankers, mutual savings banks, and savings 
and loan associations. The local market arca is 
approximated by the SMSA. The sample consists of 
62,409 loans in 111 SMSAs. The data attlp calculated as 
annual averages for all reported loans (i.e., no: dnnual 
averages of monthly data).j The number OI loans for 
these SMSAs range from 63 to 5,295. All loans are for 
existing dwellings since the commitment lag tends to 
be shorter for existing than Ir new dwellirg and 
allows the terms at the closing date to reflect ,nore 
accurately current mortgage market conditions. The 
interest rate is an effective rate calculated by the 
’ This may pnduce biased estimate3 if them atr significantly mote 
loans in one or mon months thar. the average number, But this 
problem is probably not serious for cross-sectional dam. 
FHLBB’s amortizing initial fees and charges over a 
ten-year period. 
These data allow several improvements in the 
study of the relationship between market structure 
and perfonnance.Oneistheuseofanelfcctiveinteres. 
rate on conventiotml mortgage loans only, while most 
studies use 8ver8ge km rates 8s cakulatd by 
dividing total Interest and fees by total loans per year. 
As Heggestad {1979) points out, one of the obvious 
problems of using aver* loan rates is that interest 
rates vary with the type, maturity. and risk charac- 
teristics of loans, so part of the variation in loan rates 
may result from differences in the economic circumst- 
ances of SMSAs rather than Born market structuT(I. 
The data employed in this paper isolate the conven- 
tional mortgage market and include all the major 
mortgage lenders Since the effective interest rate in 
this study is determined by the interactions of all 
major lenders it should allow better estimation of the 
relationship between structure and performance. 
A second improvement comes from the measures 
of risk. All loans are conventional. By contrast, 
previous studies (Davis and Verbrugge (1978): 
Longbrake and Peterson, 1979) have included FHA 
and VA mortgages along with conventional mor- 
tgages, yet the risk characteristics of conventional and 
nonconventional loans may differ. Except for 
Longbrake and Peterson (1979) the present study is 
the first to use foreclosure rates. 
AN EMPlRlCAL MODEL 
The model generally used to test the structure- 
performance relationship in financial markets is of the 
form” 
P =f(D, C. M. s, x 1 (1) 
where 
D= 
c= 
M= 
S = 
x= 
P= 
set of variables to measure demand 
conditions 
set of variables to measure cost dikrences 
across firms and markets 
measure of deposit concentration 
other structure variables 
set of control variables associated with prod- 
uct characteristics 
some aspect of performance, such as the 
interest rate on loans. 
s Heggeslsd ( 1979) reviecvs senml applications of this form. 
AS H-tad (1979) argues, no rigorous theoret- 
ic8l model provides the correct specticaticn of the 
relationship between structure and performance or, 
Con~uCntly, the appropriate functional form of the 
CqU8tiort.* Equation (1) is a reduced-form equation.’ 
Its use here facilitates comp8risons of past research 
with the present paper. Also, a linear, reduced-form 
equation allows one to measure the net impacts of 
independent variabks regardks of whether the 
supply or demand equations have shifted.s 
Dettnutd conditions Dare measured by population 
and the percentage change between 1974 and 1975. 
Both should be positively related to mortgage rates. 
The local quantity of deposits C is used to measure 
cost differences 8cTOsS firms and markets. The greater 
the quantity of deposits, the lower interest rates 
should be, certeris paribus.’ The combined total 
deposits of commercial banks, mutual savings banks, 
and savings ard loan associations and the percentage 
change between 1974 and 1975 control for cost 
differences. lo 
An additional element of costs is the ratio of the 
number ofcommerical hank ofices to the numbers of 
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associ- 
:ltion otlices’ ’ if there are differences between firms 
m the sptead between borrowing and lending rates, 
these difkerences may a.&ct differentials in local 
interest rates. For example, diBerences in regulation 
concerning the composition of assets and in 
Fegulation Q may produce differences in returns and 
t le costs of funds to variorrs types of firms. Jfit is easier 
for commercial banks to obtain charters than thrifts, 
then artificial entry barriers may a&t interest rate 
dikrentials. One msy expect that a higher ratio, 
- 
crrreris p&us, leads to higher mortgage rates be- 
cause mutuai savings banks and savings and loan 
associations must invest a higher proportion of their 
assets in conventional mortgages than do commercial 
banks. 
Several control variables relate to the product 
itself: loan-to-value, term-to-maturity, and forec- 
losure rate variablesi In this study there is a single 
produrZ of heterogeneous quality: conventional mor- 
tgages. The greater the risk characteristics of bor- 
rowers, cetetis @bus, the higher the interest rates, to 
compensate lenders for higher probabilities of default 
or delinquency. The signs on both the loan-to-value 
and foreclosure variables should be positive, whi!e the 
sign cur the term-to-maturity variable is ambiguous. A 
longer term lead:; to lower monthly payments and 
consequently to a !ower probability of default; hence 
term-to-maturity might take a negative sign. But a 
longer term implies a slo~r paydown; hence term-to- 
maturity might also take a positive sign (rellecting 
higher risk for longer terms.l’3 Since there is no u 
pric)ri reasoning to choose one explanation over the 
other, the expected sign is ambiguous.‘* 
Market structure variables M and S define the 
environment within which fi,,nt compete. This paper 
delines market structure as the environment within 
which commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and 
savings and loan associations compete. Mortgage 
bankers are excluded since there is no data by SMSA 
on the location, number. or size of mortgage ban- 
kers.” Numbers of the three types of firms are one 
measure of market structure. Two quantitative 
measures of the numbers of institutions are used: the 
number affirms and the total number of ofllces (which 
includes all bi arches). if the branches of a firm do not 
compete with each other, the specification of thi, 
variable is important. Competition may best be 
measured as the number oflirms not the total number 
of olfices. since br,anches may represc.rt more of u 
convenience to customers than as ‘competing lirms. 
Deposit concentration ratios for commercial banks 
are also used to measure the effect of market structure 
on interest rates. Ratios for commercial banks are 
” ti forrcloQurr rate is obtained fmm unpublished FHl PB tiles 
ud is C&dated for Federal Savings and Loan lnstnanrc Corporation- 
lmurcd savi@s and toan assuciaiions by ShiSA in 1975. Loan-to. 
value mlios and tcrm~ of ma&nily are obtained fmm Federal Home 
LoanBankBoanl(1979). 
u Meador ( 19811 argue+ h default risk attaches to market value 
of house, nol to borrower iacome. In effect, rhe botmwer has a put 
oP=n. 
” ti Banh. Co&x. and Yezcr (1979) for .s discussion of this 
polfll 
‘* This should td limit the ~sults of the study since mortgage 
baokemarenotnetkndcrs. 
used. since a three- or live-firm concentration ratio 
will general11 include only commercial banks because 
they are typtwlly the largest depository financial 
institutions in any SMSA.i6 
A dummy variable for unit banking is included to 
test whether unit banking laws increase competition 
through lower deposit concentration than do statc- 
wide and limited branching laws.” 
The measure of performance P is the efhxtive 
interest rate on conventional mortgage loans. 
List of Independent Variables 
POP = 
P7574 = 
DEP = 
07574 = 
FOR = 
LI’ = 
TM = 
FIRM = 
OFFICES = 
co3 = 
cm = 
L’B = 
RCS = 
population in 1975 
percentage change in population 
between 1974 and 1975 
total deposits at commercial 
banks, mutual savings banks and 
savings and loan associations in 
1975 
percentage change in total de- 
posits between 1974 and 1975 
foreclosure rate in 1975 
loan-to-value ratio in 1975 
term to maturity in 1975 
number of cvlmmercial banks. 
mutual savings banks, end savings 
and ioan associations in 1975 
number of offices of commercial 
banks, mutual savings banks, :I, ._ 
savings and loan assoc:p*: ‘, in 
1975 (includes bran&f 
three-firm deposit concentration 
ratio in 1975 
five-firm deposit concentratinn 
ratio in 1975 
unit banking dummy (UB= 1 if 
unit bank state. UB=O othcr- 
wise) 
number of commercial bank off- 
ices divided by the numbers 01 
mutual savings bank and savings 
and loan association ofices in 
1975. 
I6 Davis and Vedxugge ( 1979) calculate concentnuion ratios for 
all types of institutions and fti that these variables do nol explain much 
of the differentials in interest rates. Deposit ratios atx from Summary of 
Arcounrs undDeposirs (1974.1975). 
” It can be argued that state branching laws for commercial banks 
represent the state branching environment for all institutions. II is 
likely that states with liberal commercial bank branching laws would 
also treat mutual savings banks and savings and loan assuciations in a 
similar manner. 
TABLE 1. Regression Results Using Effective Interest Rate as Dependent VariabIe 
--- 
Independent Equation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lntorcapt 
POP 
P7574 
DEP 
07574 
FOR 
LV 
TM 
FIRM 
OFFICES 
co3 
CO5 
L’B 
RCS 
R2 
a.21= 
(22.00) 
0.0001~ 
(1.35) 
1.49 
(1.16) 
-0.00001 
(-1.03) 
1.68C 
(3.00) 
0.45’ 
(1.40) 
o.ol* 
w6) 
-0.006 
(-0.56) 
-0.0009* 
(-2.17) 
8.16C 
(21.31) 
-0.0004 
( -0.66) 
1.62 
(1.23) 
-0.00001 
(-0.68) 
1.49c 
(2.64) 
0.37 
(1.14) 
o.ol* 
mo) 
-0.004 
(-0.37) 
(2:::; 
-0.0001 
(0.38) 
1.670 
(1.30) 
-0.00001 
(-0.74) 
I .75c 
(3.11) 
0.38 
(1.20) 
o.ol* 
(2.07) 
-0.008 
(-0.76) 
7.99 7.85C 8.17c 
(21.03) (18.89) (21.87) 
-0.0001 0.00008 0.0001 
(0.49) (0.29) (0.24) 
1.61 1.12 1.36 
(1.26) (0.88) (1.05) 
-0.0000I - 1,.0000 1 -0.00001 
(-0.85) (-0.66) (-0.G3) 
1.79c 1.78C 1.94c 
(3.17) (3.23) (3.25) 
0.42u 0.470 0.48’ 
(1.33) (1.49) (1.47) 
O.o)* 0.02c 0.01= 
(2.12) (2.76) (1.48) 
-0.0008 -0.0006 0.0004 
(-0.77) (-0.58) (0.04) 
0.0002 
(0.79) 
0.003c 
(2.38) 
0.003c 
(2.44) 
-0.17c 
(2.92) 
0.2827 0.2543 0.2892 0.2911 0.3076 
0.036 
(2.07) 
0.2798 
e Signifkance at 90 percent level. 
* Sfni~cancs at 95 percent IOVSI. 
c Slgnlflcance at 99 percent level. 
RESULTS 
The six cross-sectional regressions appear in Table 
I.‘” Including each structure variable in a separate 
regression avoids the problem of multicollinearity. 
For example, the branching variable UB is clearly 
related to the concentration and number of insti- 
tutlons variables. Savage and Solomon (1980) find 
that states with unit banking laws have lower deposit 
concentration ratios than do states that allow some 
form of branching. The population variables POP 
and P7574 are generally insigr&ant. Where sign6 
cant. their positive sign suggests that they exert 
upward pressure on interest rP.tes.” 
- 
Is IRc use of deposits and populatiivl separately is cquivalenl to
using their ~Sos. except hat the res!xctive coet.icients arc un- 
consuaind. 
‘s Sidar w.uhs for these variables AR found in Kaufman (I%6) 
and Longbmke ad Merson (1979). 
The coefficient on the total deposit variable DEP is 
always negative but never significantly d&rent from 
zero. The percentage change in deposits variable 
07574 is uniformly positive and significant.” This 
suggests that, with all else remaqning the same. the 
greater the percentage change in deposits in an area, 
the higher interest rates tend to be. Whrle this result is 
unexpected, it may indicate that this variable is a 
proxy for growth of the effective demand for housing. 
The borrower risk variables FOR and ~3’ both 
exert positive impacts on interest rates and are 
generally significant. The signs on the term-to- 
maturity variable are generally negative and are never 
signilicant. By contrast, Longbrake and Peterson 
m llle percentage cluulge beween 1973 and 1975 for tN& 
popularion and deposits were also used. These variahk were new 
signif~anr. implying that markets rcpcl ralher quickly. 
(1979) found no signscant relationship between 
foreclosure ates and interest rates. 
Thf -umber of firms FIRM has a negative and 
sign&ant impact on interest rates, implying that an 
increase of ten firms would reduce interest rates by 
nine basis points. The total number of oflices 
OFFICES, by contrast, does not exert a significant 
impact on interest rates. These results confirm the 
notion that areas with many firms, ceteris paribus, 
have lower interest rates, while the number ofoffices is 
not a significant determinant. Hence increased branc- 
hing does dot reduce interest rates. 
The three- and five-firm concentration ratios CO3 
and C05, respe&ely, exerted positive and significant 
impacts on interest rates. It is interesting tocompare 
the sizles ofcoefficients on the concentration variables 
with those found in other studies. Edwards (1972) 
compares the work of three studies that iind concen- 
tration\ variables to be significant and virtually the 
same at 0.006. The magnitude of the concentration 
variable in this study is 0.003 (suggesting that a 10 
percent increase in coccentration will increase loan 
rates by three basis points). The reason for the size 
diflerenlw: may be because the other studies consider 
only cosrlmercial banks, overestimating the effects of 
concentration on loan rates in markets with several 
types of competing tirms. Studies using average loan 
rates may attribute rate differences due to the non- 
uniform and multiproduct compositions of loan 
portfolios to concentration. 
The coel?icient on the unit banking variable UB is 
negative and significantly different from zero, suggest- 
ing that states with limi!ed and statewide branching 
laws offer higher interest rates, cereris paribus. than do
states l+th unit banking laws. This result also 
suppo:ts the finding above that areas with a relatively 
large number of firms FIRM offer relatively low 
interest rates. This connection between the eflects of 
UBand FIRM variables results because unit banking 
states have more firms than do states with limited or 
statewide branching laws. 
The ratio of commercial bank offires to mutual 
savings banks and savings and loan association 
ollices RCS has a posiuve and significant impact on 
Interest rates. The size of the coefficient indicates, for 
example. that a 10 percent increase in this ratio would 
increase interest rates by 30 basis points, suggesting 
that differences produced by differing local propor- 
tions of the various types offirms atfect mortgage rate 
differentials. This is expected since the higher the 
number of commercial banks relative to the numbers 
of mutual savings banks and savings and loan 
associations. the weaker is the relative commitment of 
the firms lo the mortgage market. This variable serves 
as a proxy for d&ing differeaca in the charac- 
teristics of the firms competing in this market and 
reinforces the notion that the modeling of all types of 
firms in the market is essential to an understanding of 
differentials in interest rates. 
The coefficients of determination Rzs range from 
0.2543 to 0.3076, compared with approximately 0.15 
for this type of study, as discussed in Hcggestad 
(1979). This improvement results from the use of an 
effective interest rate for a welldelinad product 
market. Most of the previous studies did not control 
for nonbank thrifts, risk measures for a wellddined 
market, and differences produced by varying the 
proportions of banks and nonbank thrifts. 
CONCLUSION 
The tests in this paper suggest that greater com- 
petition among firms in an area lowers mortgage 
interest rates. The meas!:res of competition that 
helped explain interest rate differentials are the 
number of firms, deposit concentration ratios, and 
branching laws. The ratlc of commercial banks to 
mutual savings banks and savings and loan associ- 
ations had a significant and positive &t on interest 
rates. States with unit banking laws have lower 
interest rates han states that allow branching. Since 
states with unit banking laws have more firms and 
lower concentration ratios than do states with limited 
and statewide branching, it seems reasonable to point 
to branching laws as the key to determining the 
relative degree of competition i an area. One policy 
implication ofthis result is that one means oireducing 
mortgage rates is increased control of branching and 
the relaxation ofentry restrictions ofnew firms. One 
limitation of this study is the extent to which one may 
make policy conclusions for all finanacial markets. An 
implication of this study is that here is no national 
market for mortgages. While this allows one to extend 
policy suggestions for households and small firms. 
national markets may exist for relatively arge firms. 
For example, large firms may already borrow or! the 
national market and not be subject to the policy 
conclusions drawn from this study. It is important to 
recognize diflerences in product markets when study- 
ing the probable effects of change in regulation. 
This study also has implications for some recent 
developmen,;s in the finanacial sector. The increase in
bank mergers, bank and nonbank acquisitions by 
bank-holding companies, and the activities offoreign 
banks in the United States have altered the structure 
of the banking industry. 2 ’ In one sense these develop 
*I For a discussion of these issues see Rhoadcts (1960). 
ments are a libemlization of the restrictions on Aspinwall, 2 C. April 1970. Market smmzture and com- 
interstate banking in the McFadden Act, but the me&l bank morrgage interest tates. Sourkrn Ecommic 
potential edkts on market concentration. numbers of Journal 36:3X-384. 
fhs aad branches and market shares of d&rent Barth. J . Co&s. J.. ;rsd Yczer, A. 1979. Fiiial in- 
types of firms of mergers, bank-holding companies, stitution ngulations. &lining and mortggge markets. in 
and foreign banking need to be anal@. For The repdation of Financiallnshnbns, Federal Reserve 
exam* this study suggests that the relative propor- 
Bank of Bosmn. 
tionsddifferenttypesof~nnsinamarketwillaffect &N~MI, G. J- May 1972. Economies of cale of tinanciaI 
the local mortgage rate. Research on the degree of 
institutions. Journal of Money. Credit and Banking 
4312-341. 
substitutability between the traditional forms oflirms 
and holding companies is needed to define the 
appropriate market. Once the market is defii 
researc!~ similar to the present study may provide 
insights about the competitive lfects of interstate 
banking on competition. 
This study suggests hat an increase in interstate 
banking will produce increased concentration a d 
decrease competition among fial inter;tiiaries. 
Savage and Solomon (1960) expect hat interstate 
banking will increase the number of commercial 
banks and decrease deposit concentration ratios in 
states with statewide branching laws. In other states, 
they expect interstate banking to decrease the number 
of commercial banks and increase concentration 
ratios l-he present paper suggests an interesting 
policy implication, given that these predictions are 
accurate. If relaxation of the McFadden Act prom- 
otes dr NW entry, then states that previously allowed 
statewide branching may witness an increase in
competition. On the other hand, states previously 
under unit banking laws would have less competition 
owing to a decline in the number of firms. This study 
suggests that the new branches in formerly unit 
banking states will not increase competition i them. 
One major concern is that while all local markets may 
be made more competitive through the reduction of 
restrictions on& PKWY) entry, it may be that only those 
states formerly under statewide branching laws will 
receive more competitive environments from the 
introduction of interstate banking. Obviously more 
research on the expected outcome de nouo entry and 
branching from the relaxation ofthe McFadden Act 
is necessary to assess the desirability of interstate 
banking. 
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